Contrary to prior belief, we show that there exist commitment, zero-knowledge and general function evaluation protocols with universally composable security, in a model where all parties and all protocols have access to a single, global, random oracle and no other trusted setup. This model provides significantly stronger composable security guarantees than the traditional random oracle model of Bellare and Rogaway [CCS'93] or even the common reference string model. Indeed, these latter models provide no security guarantees in the presence of arbitrary protocols that use the same random oracle (or reference string or hash function).
INTRODUCTION
The random oracle model (ROM) [2] has been extremely successful as a tool for justifying the design of highly efficient cryptographic schemes that lack more direct proofs of security. Indeed, while security in the ROM does not in general imply security when the random oracle is replaced by a concrete, publically computable hash function [6, 12, 22] , it is generally accepted that security analysis in the ROM does provide strong corroboration to the resilience of the protocol in question to practical attacks.
However, when attempting to use the ROM for analyzing security of general protocols, and in particular when attempting to assert simulation-based security definitions, the following question comes up: Does security analysis in the ROM provide any composable security guarantees? In particular, what does security analysis in the stand-alone ROM say about the security of the protocol within a larger system that involves also other protocols, where these protocols may have themselves been analyzed in the ROM?
To provide a positive answer to this question, we would like to come up with a model for analyzing security of protocols in a stand-alone fashion, while taking advantage of the ROM, and still be able to provide security guarantees in a composite system where multiple such protocols co-exist and interact.
A natural approach to devising such a model is to start from an existing framework with composability guarantees, and try to add the ROM to that framework. Specifically, start from the universally composable (UC) security framework [3] that provides strong composability, and formulate the ROM as a "trusted functionality" that is available to the parties (i.e., this "random oracle functionality" simply returns an independent random value RO(x) to each query x, while maintaining consistency among different queries with the same x).
S
However, it turns out that if one wants to use the full power of the ROM, and in particular to allow the simulator, in the security analysis, to have free access to the adversary's RO queries and furthermore to set the responses of the random oracle to values of its choice, the resulting modeling loses all composability guarantees. More precisely, secure composition holds only if each instance of each protocol uses a completely different and independent random oracle than all other instances. This of course does not correspond to the practice of replacing the random oracle in all executions with a single hash function.
Furthermore, this is not just a modeling issue: Using the same instance of the RO across multiple protocols inevitably gives rise to some unavoidable attacks. For instance, consider a UC non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) protocol in the RO model. If RO is available outside the individual instance of the protocol then the transcript of the protocol (i.e., the proof) becomes transferable -it is verifiable not only by the intended verifier, but rather by anyone who has access to RO. This stands in contrast to the ideal zero knowledge functionality, which allows only the intended verifier to verify the verity of the statement. (It should be remarked that the same issue happens even in interactive Zero Knowledge protocols in the ROM, but is perhaps most evident for non-interactive ones.)
Indeed, this discrepancy between the abstract model and its intended use was already noticed in the context of the common reference string setup [4] . To handle this discrepancy, [4] suggests to explicitly consider only trusted setup constructs that are global, namely only a single instance of this setup exists in the system. In particular, this construct exists even in the "ideal model", where the protocol is replaced by a "trusted party", or an ideal functionality representing the task at hand. They then proceed to propose such a global trusted setup construct. However their construct is not just a public hash function (or a random oracle). Rather, it consists of a global public key for which each party has its own identity-based secret key. Furthermore, they argue that no "public setup construct", namely no construct that provides only public information that is available to all, can suffice for realizing tasks such as commitment or zero knowledge in the UC framework. Given that the random oracle does provide only public information, the avenue of coming up with a useful, global ROM that provides composable security guarantees seemed to have reached a dead end.
Our Contributions

The global random oracle model
We formulate a natural, global variant of the "random oracle functionality". As per the formalism of [4] , this functionality, which we denote by gRO -standing for global Random Oracle -is accessible to all parties (both honest and corrupted), both in the ideal model and in the model for protocol execution. This functionality answers consistently to all queries made by all parties. Furthermore, only a single instance of this functionality exists. As shown in [4] , the universal composition theorem holds in this model -even though multiple protocols and instances thereof use the same instance of gRO.
In addition, we incorporate in gRO a mechanism that captures the fact, sketched above, that the global random oracle, being a single global construct that provides the same information to all, allows third parties to double up as adversarial protocol participants and mount a transferability attack.
In a nutshell, this analytical mechanism provide each protocol session with a unique domain of queries: queries that pertain to a session that the querying party does not belong to are considered "illegitimate" and are disclosed to the adversary. This mechanism allows capturing security properties such as "transferable non-interactive zero knowledge", namely protocols that are zero-knowledge except for the fact that proofs may be transferable. As we explain in more details later, transferability attacks are the only ones allowed in this model. Intuitively the reason is that, whatever a malicious third party can do by accessing the RO in some concurrent adversarial protocol execution, can be done by the adversary itself in her protocol execution.
We then observe that simple variants of known protocols, such as the two-message zero-knowledge protocol of Pass [24] , is in fact UC zero knowledge in our global random oracle model (gRO model).
The gRO model, the CRS/RO model and the JUC model. The advantage of the gRO model is that it guarantees secure composition even with arbitrary protocols that use the same instance of the RO (or the same hash function). In practice it means that the RO can be reused by any protocol in the system, without jeopardizing security. Neither the standard (programmable) RO model nor the standard (programmable) CRS model give any security guarantees when the same setup is reused. One might object that there exist protocols that are UC-secure in the Joint State model (JUC) [9] where the same CRS is reused. However, the form of reusability guaranteed by the JUC model is very limited as that protocols must be pre-designed to work well together with same CRS instance. Instead, in the gRO model protocols do not need to synchronize their access to the RO.
Discussion on the random oracle model. One might wonder about the utility in rigorously arguing secure composition of protocols in the gRO model, given that this model anyway does not provide rigorous security guarantees once the random oracle is replaced by a publicly computable hash function. We provide several answers to this valid question. First, we note that attacks that take advantage of insecure composition might come up even when no other attacks are found against a protocol instantiated with some hash function. (In fact, the transferability attack is a quintessential example for such a situation.) Second, we observe that protocols in the gRO model give us a level of security that was not known to exist in any other general computation (or even zero knowledge or commitment) protocol that was proven secure in the UC framework: Indeed, protocols in that framework cannot exist without some "trusted setup" construct. All known such constructs require trust in some third party or an external entity that is outside the control of the players. Furthermore, these protocols invariably provide the trusted external entity with the ability, if played maliciously, to completely compromise the security of the players.
The gRO model is different, in that it "only" reduces the security guarantees to the level of the stand-alone security guarantees provided by the random oracle methodology to begin with. That is, the level of reassurance provided by analysis in the gRO model with respect to universally com-posable security is no lower than the level of assurance provided by analysis in the ROM for traditional, stand-alone security.
Certainly, in some respects, a protocol that was analyzed in the gRO model and instantiated with a concrete hash function may well provide better security than a protocol analyzed in the (non-global) CRS model and instantiated with a globally available reference string.
Still, it should be stressed that (similar to standard ROM) as soon as the gRO is replaced by a concrete hash function, the security guarantees provided by this model are inevitably only heuristic.
Highly-Efficient Protocols
We design efficient protocols for a variety of tasks in the gRO model.
Starting from the work of Lindell and Pinkas [18] , who constructed efficient two-party computation protocols based on Yao's garbled circuit [30] via a novel cut-and-choose technique, a prolific sequence of works [20, 19, 14, 28, 21, 17, 13, 29 , 1] have shown increasingly more efficient protocols for secure computation, which are either only stand-alone secure, or UC-secure in the CRS model [19, 16, 17, 1] . We show how to construct very efficient protocols in the gRO model, which in most cases improve on the highly efficient known existing solutions in the CRS model. In particular, we first show a highly efficient UC-commitment scheme, which compares very favorably to the most efficient known UC-commitment scheme of Lindell in [16] (in the CRS model). When plugged in [17] , this construction directly yields very efficient UCsecure protocol for two-party computation. Finally we show that non-interactive secure two-party computation (NISC) is also achievable in the gRO model, building on the work of Afshar et al. [1] . More specifically we provide the following protocols.
UC commitments in the gRO model. We show a general construction that combines the use of any straight-line extractable commitment in the gRO model and any trapdoor commitment, to construct a UC-secure commitment scheme in the gRO model. By instantiating the extractable commitment with the protocol provided by Pass in [24] and the trapdoor commitment with Pedersen's scheme [25] , we obtain an extremely efficient UC-secure commitment scheme that is significantly more efficient than the best known UC-secure commitment scheme in the CRS model of [16] . Concretely our protocol requires only 5 exponentiations per party and 5 rounds of communication in total (including the commitment and decommitment phases).
UC two-party computation in the gRO model. We observe that the highly efficient UC-secure two-party computation protocol (2PC for short) of Lindell [17] , that works in the CRS model, requires the use of UC-secure zero knowledge proofs, which in turns is based on UC-Commitments only. By instantiating Lindell's construction with our UCcommitments, we obtain a more efficient UC-2PC protocol in the gRO model. UC NISC in the gRO model. NISC -non-interactive secure computation-is a two-message protocol run between parties P1 and P2, where P1 speaks first. Very recently, Afshar et al. in [1] presented the most efficient NISC protocol, which is UC-secure in the CRS model. We show how to instantiate this construction without using the CRS, in the gRO model, while preserving the non-interactive nature of the protocol. Our construction is slightly less efficient than the protocol of [1] but but do away with the need to rely on a non-global (programmable) reference string.
Our Techniques
Here we provide an overview of the main technical ideas underlying our constructions.
Efficient UC Commitment in gRO Model
Recall that a UC secure commitment scheme requires two main properties: (a) Equivocation: When the receiver is corrupted, the simulator should be able to commit (on behalf of the honest sender) in such a way that it is able to decommit to any desired value. (b) Extractability: When the sender is corrupted, the simulator should be able to extract the committed value during the commitment phase.
Note that the observability property of the gRO naturally yields the desired extraction property discussed above. Indeed, this was already used to build extractable commitments in prior works (see e.g., [24] ). How to achieve the equivocation property, however, is not immediately clear. Indeed, as discussed earlier, in the gRO model the simulator cannot program the outputs of the random oracle. Further, since we do not allow for trusted setups (such as a CRS), the simulator does not have immediate access to a "trapdoor" that allows for equivocation.
Towards that end, our starting point is the observation (already implicit in prior works) that the task of equivocation can, in fact, be reduced to the task of trapdoor extraction. More concretely, consider a trapdoor commitment scheme in the CRS model where the knowledge of the CRS trapdoor allows for equivocation (but does not compromise the hiding property of the scheme). For example, Pedersen's commitment scheme [25] satisfies these properties. Then, consider the following protocol template: first, the receiver chooses the CRS of the trapdoor commitment scheme on its own and sends it to the sender along with an extractable commitment to the associated trapdoor. For concreteness, let us think of the extractable commitment as simply the answer of the gRO when queried with the trapdoor string. Next, the committer commits to its input string by simply using the trapdoor commitment scheme. Since we want to preserve the extractability property from the committer side, we further require the committer to query the gRO on the opening of the above commitment and then commit to the answer of the gRO via another instance of trapdoor commitment. (Similar ideas were used in [23] .) Now, consider the following simple strategy for equivocation: the simulator first extracts the value committed by the receiver in the first message (by simply observing its query to the gRO) and then uses it as a trapdoor to later equivocate in both of the trapdoor commitments. While such an approach would indeed work against a semi-honest receiver, unfortunately, it does not work against a malicious receiver. The problem is that the above protocol does not preclude a cheating receiver from committing to some bogus value (instead of the correct trapdoor). Note that here we cannot simply require the receiver to provide a proof of consistency since proving that a given string is the output of the random oracle is not an NP statement.
Going further, one can observe that an extractable commitment in the gRO model is, in fact, only effective if it is later decommitted. This is because otherwise the adversary can choose to simply not query the gRO at all! Thus, in order to verify that the receiver actually commits to the valid trapdoor, we ask it to open its commitment in the decommitment phase. Now, the simulator can indeed extract the trapdoor from the first message of the receiver and be convinced of its validity since otherwise the receiver would fail to decommit properly later on.
While the above modification yields us the desired equivocation property, unfortunately, the resultant protocol is no longer sound against adversarial committers. This is because after viewing the trapdoor revealed by the receiver, a cheating committer can now also equivocate in the same manner as the simulator. Indeed, it may seem that now the simulator and an adversarial committer have the exact same power (i.e., both have access to the trapdoor). In order to solve this problem, we leverage the asymmetry between the simulator and the cheating committer. In particular, note that the simulator knows how to equivocate even at the start of the decommitment phase (conditioned on the event that it previously extracted a valid trapdoor from the receiver), while the cheating sender can only equivocate after the receiver reveals the trapdoor. Thus, we now require the committer to commit to its openings of the commitments (from the commitment phase) before the receiver reveals the trapdoor. This immediately prevents the committer from being able to equivocate, but still preserves the equivocation property of the simulator. Due to technical reasons, we require the above commitment to also be extractable. Very briefly, this is necessary to formally reduce the binding property of the UC commitment scheme to the binding property of the trapdoor commitment scheme.
Discussion on Efficiency. We compare the efficiency of our scheme with Lindell's commitment scheme [16] (which, to the best of our knowledge, is the most efficient UC secure commitment scheme in the CRS model, in the literature). Round Complexity. The commitment phase in our scheme requires 2 rounds while the commitment phase in [16] is non-interactive. On the positive side, our decommitment phase requires 3 rounds, while [16] requires 5 rounds. Computational Complexity. Prior works have demonstrated that the main bottleneck in the computational efficiency is the number of exponentiations. When instantiated with Pedersen's commitment scheme, our protocol requires only 5 exponentiations per party: the commitment phase requires 1 exponentiation from the receiver to compute the parameters for Pedersen commitment, and 4 exponentiations from the committer to compute two Pedersen's commitments; in the decommitment phase the same exponentiations are required in the reverse order for the verification of the parameters and the decommitments. In contrast, in [16] , requires 13 exponentiations per parties. Our protocol additionally requires 6 random oracle evaluations.
Efficient NISC in gRO Model.
Our starting point is the NISC protocol of [1], which is UC-secure in the CRS model. Our goal is to emulate their approach in the gRO model. Towards that end, we observe that this task can be reduced to implementing a UC secure oblivious transfer (OT) protocol in the gRO model. In particular, since our focus is on efficiency, recall that the NISC protocol of [1] relies on the highly efficient UC OT protocol of Peikert et. al [26] . (For convenience, let us refer to this protocol as PVW OT.) Therefore, our goal then is to realize a version of PVW OT in the gRO model.
Realizing this simple idea, however, turns out to be highly problematic. Note that since a CRS is not available in our setting, the natural approach is to have the OT receiver choose the OT parameters (that comprise the CRS in [26] ) and provide a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPoK) of consistency. We stress that both the ZK and PoK properties of the proof are crucial here to ensure that the resulting OT protocol is fully simulatable. Specifically, the ZK property is necessary to allow the simulator to cheat in the computation of the parameters and extract both the inputs of a malicious OT sender. The PoK property, on the other hand, allows the simulator to extract the input of the receiver. Note, however, that a ZK proof in the gRO model requires at least two rounds [24] . As such, the resulting OT protocol in the gRO model becomes 3 rounds which violates the non-interactivity requirement for NISC.
Towards that end, upon closer inspection of the NISC protocol of [1], we make the following observation: Let P1 and P2 denote the two parties in the NISC protocol where P1 is the evaluator of the garbled circuit, and therefore the receiver of the OT, and P2 is the generator of the garbled circuit and therefore the sender of the OT. Then, [1] uses the simulatability property of OT against malicious OT senders to extract the input of the sender P2.
Our first idea is to extract the critical information from P2 by exploiting the observability property of gRO. Specifically, we modify the NISC protocol of [1] by requiring that the randomness used to compute the commitments and the garbled circuits is generated by querying gRO. This enables the simulator -that observes the queries-to extract all the keys of the garbled circuits in "straight-line" without simulating the OT protocol for adversarial OT sender. Therefore, the problem of implementing the NISC protocol of [1] in the gRO model now reduces to constructing a 2 round one-sided simulatable OT, namely, an OT which is UC simulatable against malicious receivers but only guarantees indistinguishability security against malicious senders.
Our next contribution is to provide such a construction. The high-level strategy is to replace the (2-round) ZKPoK in the above construction of PVW OT with a non-interactive witness hiding (or witness indistinguishable) PoK in the gRO model. Implementing this idea, however, turns out to be quite non-trivial. Recall that the security of PVW OT against a malicious sender relies on the hardness of the DDH problem: an adversary distinguishing the input bit of the honest receiver can be used to construct an adversary that distinguishes a DDH tuple from a non-DDH tuple. This reduction goes smoothly when the receiver in PVW OT gives a ZKPoK proof of the correctness of the OT parameters since the DDH distinguisher can use its challenge tuple as the OT parameters and give a simulated ZK proof of correctness without knowledge of the corresponding witness.
However, when we replace the ZK proof with (say) a witness hiding (WH) proof, then the above reduction does not work because the DDH distinguisher does not know the witness for the proof. Towards that end, we pursue the idea of using a witness-indistinguishable (WI) proof instead of a WH proof. We have the following two-fold requirement: first, the statement for the WI proof should enable a secondary witness that can be used by the DDH distinguisher in the above reduction to construct a valid proof (without knowledge of the witness corresponding to the challenge tuple). Second, the PoK property of the proof should enable extraction of a cheating OT receiver's input even if she uses the secondary witness.
As we discuss later in Sec.4, realizing the above two properties simultaneously turns out to be a difficult task. Our final idea towards this end is to essentially run the OT protocol twice in parallel. Specifically, we require the OT receiver to choose two independent OT parameters and give a single WIPoK proof that proves the correctness of one of them. The sender then secret shares each of its OT input into two parts and then computes two different OT messages (using different OT parameters), one for each set of input shares. Now, in order to argue security against cheating senders, we can construct a DDH distinguisher who uses the challenge tuple as one of the two OT parameters and generates the second one on its own. This allows the distinguisher to successfully give a WI proof of correctness. On the other hand, when the OT receiver is corrupted, the soundness of WIPoK ensures that at least one of the OT parameters is honestly generated. Therefore, we can ensure that a cheating receiver cannot learn both the inputs of the honest sender. In particular, the simulator uses the PoK property to extract the input of the receiver (which may be ⊥ if the one set of OT parameters chosen by the receiver is malformed, since in this case, the receiver will not learn either of the inputs of the honest sender). We refer the reader to Sec. 4 for more details.
Discussion on Efficiency. Our one-sided simulatable OT in the gRO model is more expensive in terms of exponentiations compared with the PVW OT in the CRS model. This is due to the WIPoK that the OT receiver has to perform at the beginning of the protocol to prove the consistency of the OT parameters. The WIPoK protocol that we use requires t parallel repetitions of a Σ-protocol (which are necessary to achieve straight-line extractability [11] in the gRO model), where t is the statistical security parameter. The underlying Σ-protocol is based on the Σ-protocol provided in [10] to prove OR-statements, and requires 8 exponentiations. Therefore, in total the proof requires 8t exponentiations. We stress that this proof is executed only once at the beginning, and the same parameters can be reused for all the subsequent transfers.
Furthermore, as our OT-protocol consists of a double repetition of PVW OT, each transfer is twice more expensive than a transfer with PVW OT. Additionally, our protocol requires 4.5t random oracle evaluations (the explanation of such values are deferred to Sec. 4). However, we observe that the NISC protocol of [1] requires (O(tn+t 2 ) exponentiations, where t is the statistical parameter for the cut-and-choose protocol and n is the size of the input of one of the parties. Therefore, when plugged into NISC, our one-sided simulatable OT construction does not add a significant overhead.
THE GLOBAL ROM
In this work we show how to model the random oracle as a global functionality and achieve UC-security in this model. Before describing our model we provide a brief overview of the definition of UC and generalized UC.
The UC framework was introduced by Canetti in [3] to model security for protocols running in the complex network environment like the Internet. The framework is based on the ideal/real world paradigm, and the complex interactions between protocols are modeled via the concept of the environment Z. In the ideal world, one specifies an ideal functionality F as an interactive Turing machine that privately communicates with the parties and the adversary S and computes a task in a trusted manner. The specification of the functionality also models the adversary's ability to influence the computation and the information that the protocol leaks.
In the real world, one specifies a protocol Π as an interactive Turing machine executed by the parties. Parties communicate over the channel in presence of an adversary A which controls the schedule of the communication over the channel, and can corrupt parties. When a party is corrupted the adversary receives its secret input and its internal state. In this work, we consider only static adversaries, which means that A can corrupt a party only before the protocol execution starts.
The basic UC execution model lets the environment Z determine the inputs to the parties running the protocol and see the outputs generated by these parties, and also allow free communication between the environment and the adversary A/S. A protocol Π securely realizes a functionality F in the UC framework if for any real world adversary A, there exists an ideal adversary S, such that for any PPT environment Z the view of an interaction with the protocol and A is indistinguishable from the view of an interaction with the trusted party F and S. One also consider a Ghybrid model, where the real-world parties are additionally given access to an ideal setup functionality G. During the execution of the protocol, the parties can send inputs to, and receive outputs from, the functionality G.
A crucial aspect of the UC framework is its modularity: when programs call subroutines, these subroutines are treated as separate entities that can be analyzed separately for their security properties by way of realizing a functionality G. It is then argued, via the universal composition theorem, that any protocol that uses subroutine calls to G keeps all its security properties when G is replaced by a protocol that realizes it.
However, the universal composition theorem holds only when subroutines do not share any part of their internal states with each other or with the calling protocol. In particular, a setup functionality that is modeled as a subroutine of the analyzed protocol cannot be invoked by more than one protocol session. Consequently, when modeling trusted setup assumptions by way of trusted subroutines for protocols (as is done, e.g., in the standard modeling of the Common Reference String (CRS) model), this means that secure composition is not guaranteed when different protocol sessions use the same CRS.
The Generalized Universal Composability (GUC) framework [4] extends the UC framework in order to capture security even for the case where the same trusted setup is accessible to all protocols in the system. [4] extends the basic execution model of the UC framework to allow the environment to create parties that run multiple protocols and sessions thereof in a single execution. All such parties have access to the same setup functionality, that is therefore called global functionality. The global functionality exists both in the real and the ideal system and the simulator has no control over it. This modeling has the effect that the environment can access global functionalities directly (via protocols that it has created and interact with the global functionalities). It is no longer restricted to interacting with the global functionality via the adversary/simulator.
Then, as in the UC-framework, a single session of protocol Π is identified. Let s * denote the SID of this session. It is required that for any adversary there exists a simulator such that no environment, having access to the global functionality, can tell whether it is interacting with the adversary and a 'real' system where parties of session s * run protocol Π, or with the simulator and an 'ideal' system where the parties of session s * are interacting with F.
The global random oracle model. We aim to model the random oracle as a global functionality and to achieve UC-security in this model. Let us first consider a simplistic candidate formulation: When queried by anyone for a value x, the random oracle functionality simply checks if x was queried before by anyone. If not, then it returns a freshly chosen random string of some pre-specified length. If yes then the previously chosen value is returned again -even if the earlier query was made by another party. No other information is disclosed to anyone. Let us call this functionality G sRO (where the s stands for "strict"). While G sRO is natural, it seems to be of little help for proving security of protocols. For one, G sRO does not allow the simulator to "emulate" the random oracle functionality to the environment, or in other words to "program" the answers of the random oracle. Indeed, recall that the environment can create additional parties that query G sRO and report the answer directly back. Furthermore, if we attempt to modify the definition of G sRO by allowing the simulator to determine the answers, we will lose the usefulness of the functionality altogether since the adversary too would be able to attack protocols by modifying the answers accordingly. This means that we essentially have to use this "non-programmable" variant of the random oracle.
More importantly, G sRO is of little help to the simulator for another reason: The environment can obtain random-oracle values, via the auxiliary parties, without having the adversary/simulator be aware of the queried values or answers. This means that G sRO is essentially useless to the simulator. Indeed, the impossibility results for UC computation in the plain model (e.g. [5, 8] ) are easily extendible to the G sRO model.
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If one attempts to modify the definition of G sRO so that it will disclose to the simulator all the queries made by other parties then one will again lose the usefulness of the functionality altogether, since the adversary too would be able to see the queries made by uncorrupted parties.
We provide a mechanism that allows designing protocols where the oracle queries made by honest parties are invisible to external entities, while providing sufficient information to the simulator to "extract" illegitimate queries made by the environment. We first present the mechanics of this mechanism. Next we present the semantics and the justification.
The mechanism is simple: the random oracle functionality continues to answer oracle queries as before. In addition, it now agrees to disclose, to some pre-specified set of ideal functionalities, some of the values queried by parties. The 1 Still, it should be kept in mind that having access to a random oracle such as G sRO is not something that can be emulated in the standard model using an efficiently computable hash function family. In particular, the impossibility results of [6] still hold even with respect to this model.
Functionality G gRO
Parameters: output length ℓ(n) and a listF of ideal functionality programs.
1. Upon receiving a query x, from some party P = (pid, sid) or from the adversary S do:
• If there is a pair (x, v) for some v ∈ {0, 1} ℓ(n)
in the (initially empty) list Q of past queries, return v to P . Else, choose uniformly v ∈ {0, 1} ℓ(n) and store the pair (x, v) in Q. Return v to P .
• Parse x as (s, x ′ ). If sid = s then add (s, x ′ , v) to the (initially empty) list of illegitimate queries for SID s, that we denote by Q |s .
2. Upon receiving a request from an instance of an ideal functionality in the listF , with SID s, return to this instance the list Q |s of illegitimate queries for SID s. idea is that these ideal functionalities will then forward the disclosed values to the adversary/simulator. (The reason for having these values disclosed only to ideal functionalities, rather than directly to the adversary/simulator, is to make it explicit that these values are leaked by the functionalities. We discuss this important issue at more length below.) Determining which queried values are disclosed to an ideal functionality F is done as follows. Queries are expected to have an explicit session identifier (SID) field, namely, a query x is parsed as the pair x = (s, x ′ ) where s is the SID. If the content of the SID field of the query differs from the content of the SID field of the querying party P (recall that in the UC framework each party is identified with the unique pair (PID, SID) where PID is the program identifier and SID is the session identifier), then the query is considered "illegitimate", and can be disclosed to the instance of F whose SID is the one in the query. It is stressed that illegitimate queries are answered as usual; they are just recorded separately and potentially disclosed. The resulting random oracle functionality, denoted G gRO , is described in Fig. 1 .
The rationale behind this way of defining (il-)legitimate queries is the following. On the one hand, it allows designing protocols where the legitimate participants make RO queries that are never disclosed (simply prefix each query by the SID of the present session). Furthermore, it forces an ideal functionality to explicitly represent the information that is leaked by ideal functionalities regarding the oracle queries.
To further exemplify the properties of G gRO , let us consider the case of zero-knowledge protocols in the presence of G gRO . Recall that the traditional ideal Zero Knowledge functionality, F ZK , allows a prover to convince a verifier (whose identity is determined by the prover) of the correctness of a statement without revealing any additional information, and without allowing the verifier to "transfer" the proof to another party. In contrast, as discussed in the Introduction, any proof in the global ROM is inherently transferable: To transfer a proof to party C, the verifier V simply lets C act as the verifier, and in particular have C make all the oracle queries herself. Consequently, any formal modeling of the global ROM should mirror this property of the global Functionality F tZK F tZK is parameterized by a relation R ⊂ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * . We require that there exists a polynomial p such that (x, w) ∈ R implies that |w| ≤ p(|x|) and such that (x, w) ∈ R can be checked in time p(|x|). F tZK runs with a prover P , a verifier V and an adversary S and proceeds as follows.
• Upon receiving the first input (ZK-prover, sid, P, V, x, w) from P, do: If (x, w) ∈ R, then send (ZK-proof, sid, P, V, x) to V and S.
• When asked by the adversary, obtain from G gRO the list Q sid of illegitimate queries that pertain to SID sid, and send Q sid to S. ROM. Indeed, it can be seen that F ZK is not realizable if the parties only have access to G sRO . (Intuitively, disclosing the queries of third parties to the adversary/simulator has the effect that these third parties can no longer use G gRO to verify claims made by parties that participate in the session under consideration. This, for instance, means that G gRO can no longer be used, in the model, to "transfer" proofs made within the session to third parties.) Furthermore G gRO allows us to capture a more nuanced property: "Zero Knowledge up to transferability". This is done via a relaxed variant of the ideal zero knowledge functionality, F tZK where tzk stands for transferable zero knowledge, which leaks to the simulator the values of the illegitimate queries made with the present SID. Intuitively, the leakage of the adversarial queries made by third parties does not compromise zero knowledge beyond allowing the ability to transfer proofs. Indeed, since any query made by a third party could have been made by the adversary itself, any adversary that uses G gRO 's answer to queries made by third parties can be simulated by an adversary that makes the same queries by itself. We describe the F tZK functionality in Fig. 2 . As an additional example, in Fig. 3 we describe the Commitment functionality, that we denote by Ftcom.
UC-SECURE COMMITMENT
In this section, we show a UC secure commitment scheme C, R in the global RO model. The intuition behind the security proof was given in Sec.1.2. For the formal proof the reader is referred to the full version.
Let (TCGen, TVer, TCom, TRec, TEquiv) be a trapdoor commitment scheme, where TCGen(1 n ) is the generation algorithm that on input the security parameter n, outputs a public key pk and a trapdoor sk; TCom is the commitment algorithm that takes in input pk and a message m and outputs the commitment c and the decommitment d; TVer is the trapdoor verification algorithm that on input (pk, sk) outputs 1 if sk is the correct trapdoor associated to pk. TRec is the verification algorithm that on input (c, d, m) outputs 1 iff d is a valid decommitment of c for message m; TEquiv is a polynomial-time algorithm that (very informally) on input sk, m and some auxiliary information about a commitment c ′ , outputs a valid an opening d for the message m.
Functionality Ftcom Ftcom running in presence of an adversary S proceeds as follows:
• Commitment Phase: Upon receiving a message (commit, sid, Pi, Pj , m) from Pi where m ∈ {0, 1} n : Record the tuple (sid, Pi, Pj , m) and send the message (receipt, sid, Pi, Pj ) to Pj and S. Ignore any subsequent commit messages.
• Decommit Phase: Upon receiving (decommit, sid, Pi, Pj) from Pi, if the tuple (sid, Pi, Pj, m) is recorded then send (decommit, sid, Pi, Pj , m) to Pj and to S and halt. Otherwise ignore the message.
• When asked by the adversary, obtain from G gRO the list Q sid of illegitimate queries that pertain to SID sid, and send Q sid to S. Our commitment scheme can be based on any stand-alone secure trapdoor commitment scheme. However, in order to obtain the concrete efficiency parameters as discussed earlier in Sec.1.2, we instantiate the trapdoor commitment scheme with Pederson's perfectly hiding commitment scheme [25] , that we now describe for completeness. The generation algorithm TCGen is a randomized algorithm that outputs pk = (G, p, q, g, h) and sk = trap where p = 2q + 1, p and q are primes, G is a subgroup of order q of Z * Protocol 1. UC Commitment in the gRO model. Inputs. C has in input m ∈ {0, 1} n . R has no input. Let sid denote the session identifier.
Commitment Phase: This phase consists of two rounds.
• R → C: R first computes (pk, sk) ← TCGen(1 n ). Next, it samples a random string r (of appropriate length) and queries the gRO on the string (sid, 'R' sk r). Let aR be the resulting answer.
R sends (pk, aR) to C.
• C → R: C first computes a trapdoor commitment to its input string m, namely, (cmsg, dmsg) ← TCom(pk, m). Next, it samples a random string s and queries the gRO on the string (sid, 'C' m dmsg s). Let aC be the resulting answer. Finally, it computes a trapdoor commitment to aC as (cro, dro) ← TCom(pk, aC ).
C sends (cmsg, cro) to R.
Decommitment Phase: This phase consists of 3 rounds.
• C → R: C commits to the decommitments dmsg, dro: it first samples a random string s ′ and queries the gRO on the string (sid, 'C' dmsg dro s ′ ). It then sends the resulting answer a ′ C to R.
• R → C: R sends (sk, r) to C.
• C → R: C aborts the protocol if either of the following verifications fails: (a) aR = gRO(sid, 'R' sk r), (b) TVer(pk, sk) = 1. Otherwise, if both the checks succeed, then C reveals (m, dmsg, dro, aC , s, s ′ ) to R.
The receiver R accepts m as the decommitted value iff all of the following verifications succeed: (a) a
Efficiency.
The commitment protocol has the following complexity. Round Complexity. The protocol requires two rounds for the commitment phase and 3 rounds for the decommitment phase. Exponentiations. The total number of exponentiations is 8. Hash evaluations. The total number of hash evaluations is 6.
ONE-SIDED UC-SIMULATABLE OT
The NISC protocol of [1] builds upon the efficient PVW OT protocol of [26] , which is UC-secure in the CRS model (more specifically, they rely on a modification of it due to [28] , which we will explain later). UC-realizing NISC in the gRO model amounts to provide a 2-round OT protocol which is UC secure in the gRO model.
As we discussed in Sec. 1.2, the first approach that comes into mind to implement efficient UC-OT, is to take the PVW OT that works without the CRS and adapt it to the gRO model. This version of PVW OT was shown by Lindell and Pinkas in [19] , and it requires the receiver to choose the parameters for the OT and to provide a zero-knowledge PoK of their correctness.
This naive approach is correct, but it yields a 3-round OT protocol. The reason is that any ZKPoK in the gRO model requires at least two rounds (as observed in [24] ).
Our first observation is that the zero knowledge property is required only to extract from the sender, thus if we relax this requirement and demands only that a malicious sender cannot distinguish whether the receiver is playing with input 0 or input 1, then a witness indistinguishable proof -which can be made non-interactive in the gRO model -suffices.
Before proceeding with our discussion, let us recall the PVW OT protocol in the plain model (without CRS). Let g0, q, G be public parameters, where g0 is the generator of the group G of prime order q. PVW OT consists of two steps.
Step 1. The receiver R picks α0, y at random in Zq and set α1 = α0 + 1, and g1 = g . It sends parameters (g0, h0, g1, h1) to the sender S and additionally proves that (g0, h0, g1,
) is a DDH tuple using a ZK PoK. (Such parameters can be reused among several transfers with the same sender). Concretely, such ZKPoK is instantiated with the zero-knowledge version of a Σ-protocol for Discrete Log (due to [27] ), for the theorem
. For the actual transfer, R sends the temporary key g = g (g0, h0, g1, h1) and h, g to encrypt its two strings s0, s1.
The security of the receiver relies on the DDH assumptions. To see why, note that if b = 0, then (g0, h0, g, h) is a DDH tuple, if b = 1, then (g1, h1, g, h) is a DDH tuple. Thus, a malicious sender distinguishing bit 0 from 1 can be transformed in DDH distinguisher.
Our first attempt is to replace the ZK protocol with a (non-interactive) witness-hiding PoK protocol (WHPoK). The crucial problem of this approach is that the reduction to the DDH problem does not go through. Indeed, in order to complete the OT protocol, and thus to be able to exploit the distinguishing power of a malicious sender S * , the DDH distinguisher needs to provide a valid WHPoK, for which he does not know the witness. Although intuitively it seems that the witness hiding property should help, it is not clear how to exploit S * to extract the witness. (Note that technically one can also use a WI proof for the following theorem:
. The problem here is that extracting the witness y does not help the simulator in extracting the bit of R * ). Our approach is to run two parallel executions of Step 1 (with independent parameters), and prove using a single WIPoK that one of the parameters is correctly generated. In
Step 2, the sender will secret share its inputs in two shares, and compute two parallel executions of Step 2, one for each share. Due to the the soundness of the proof, in one of the executions the parameters are correctly computed, and thus a malicious receiver can never get two shares for both inputs.
This solution works against the malicious sender. Indeed, now we have the freedom to chose between two independent DDH tuples, and place the challenge of the DDH experiment in one of the two, while computing the WI proof with the witness of the other tuple. Against the malicious receiver, the simulator can extract the bit played in one of the sessions only. Nevertheless, this knowledge is sufficient, as the receiver will be able to get two shares only for the bit committed in the "correct" session. For the formal proof the reader is referred to the full version.
We now present our protocol in details. Notation. Our OT protocol essentially consists of two parallel sessions of the PVW OT, that we denote by session 0 and session 1 respectively. To identify the parameters used in each session we use two indexes in the subscript, where the second index identifies the session. For example, in our PVW OT the receiver send two set of OT parameters (g0, h0, g1, h1), one for each session. Hence, we denote the parameters for session 0 by (g0,0, h0,0, g1,0, h1,0), and parameters for session 1 by (g0,1, h0,1, g1,1, h1,1) . In general notation h b,s must be interpreted as follows: h b,s is the parameter h b (as in PVW OT) played in session s.
Similarly, the sender will break up its input (s0, s1) in the shares (s0,0, s1,0) to play in session 0 and (s0,1, s1,1) to play in session 1, where notation (s0,s, s1,s) means, the share of s0 in session s and the the share of s1 in session s.
We use DL to denote the Discrete Log problem. A pair (g, h) ∈ DL iff there exists x such that h = g x . We denote by NIWIpok a non-interactive witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge in the gRO model model for the (OR composition) of the DL problem. Such construction was provided in [24] and consists in the parallel repetition of t executions of a Σ-protocol for the OR composition of DL problem (shown in [10] ), where the verifier's challenge in the Σ-protocol is replaced with the answers of gRO. Finally, for easiness of explanation we omit some validity checks that S has to perform on the parameters sent by R.
Protocol 2. One-sided UC-simulatable OT.
Common parameter. (G, q, g0,0, g0,1) . Inputs. Inputs to S: a pair (s0, s1). Input to R : a bit b.
Round 1. R performs the following steps.
1. Generate OT Parameters. (Session 0) Pick y0, α0,0. Set α1,0 = α0,0 + 1. (Session 1) Pick y1, α0,1. Set α1,1 = α0,1 + 1. Compute g1,e = (g0,e) ye , h0,e = (g0) α 0,e , h1,e = (g1) α 1,e , for e = 0, 1.
2. Generate proof of consistency. Run NIWIpok for the theorem {h0,0 = (g0,0)
= (g1,1) α 0,1 } using witness
α0,e for a randomly chosen bit e. We denote this proof by proofcons. For this computation R needs to query the random oracle gRO (see [24] ).
3. Generate temporary public keys. Pick r0, r1 ∈ Zq at random. Compute temporary key for session 0. Set
4. Send parameters. Send par0 = (g0, h0,0, g1,0, h1,0); par1 = (g0, h0,1, g1,1, h1,1); proofcons, pk0, pk1 to S.
Round 2.
If the proof is accepting, S performs the following steps.
1. Compute shares. Pick s0,0, s1,0 at random, and compute s1,0 = s0,0 + s0, s1,1 = s1,0 + s1.
2. OT transfer.
• • Session 1. Play as sender of PVW OT with input (s0,1, s1,1). Namely, compute (
is the following functionality: pick s, t ∈ Zq, output u = g s · h t and v = g ′s · h ′s .
3. Send (u0,0, w0,0), (u1,0, w1,0) for session 0. Send (u0,1, w0,1), (u1,1, w1,1) for session 1. 
Efficiency.
The above protocol has the following complexity. Round Complexity. The protocol requires one message per party only. Exponentiations. In the initialization phase the receiver computes 6 exponentiation for the parameter generation and 2t exponentiations for the non-interactive WI proof proofcons. This is done only once and the same parameter can be re-used for more than one transfer. For each transfer the receiver computes 6 exponentiations. The sender computes 2t exponentiations to check the WI proof, and 8 exponentiations for each transfer. The total number of exponentiation is 4t+20 exponentiations, where t is the statistical parameter. Hash evaluations. The sender compute 2t + 1 hash evaluations for the WI proof proofcons, while the receiver evaluates the hash t + 1 times.
Batch Committing OT.
The notion of Committing-OT has been introduced by Kiraz and Schoenmakers in [15] , and is a modification of standard OT functionality where, at the end of the protocol, the OT receiver additionally receives commitments to the inputs of the sender, and the OT sender outputs the opening of such commitments.
More specifically, the sender runs OT with input (s0, r0), (s1, r1) and the receiver runs with input b. At the end of the protocol the receiver additionally obtains commitments Com(s0; r0), Com(s1, r1) and the sender outputs r0, r1.
The work [1] on which we build upon, requires a committing OT protocol which is a property already satisfied by PVW OT. To see why, note that the message sent by the OT sender in the second round can be seen as a commitment of the sender's input. (E.g., the message to retrieve string s b corresponds to the pair (u b , w b ) where
′ is the temporary key sent by the receiver). Our one-sided simulatable OT is also a committing OT. The reason is that it can be seen as a modification of the PVW OT where sender and receiver basically repeats the PVW OT twice in parallel.
Furthermore, as in [28] our protocol can be modified to allow batch OT, where the sender plays with m strings for 0 and m strings for 1: [K0,1, . . . , K0,m] and [K1,1, . . . , K1,m] and the receiver plays with one bit b only, and select one of the m-tuples. In order to send m strings, the sender simply runs procedure RAND() 2m times reusing the same temporary keys sent by the receiver for that transfer.
UC-SECURE NISC
Given any two-round UC-OT, a non-interactive UC-2PC (UC-NISC, for short) for any function f (x, y) can be easily constructed in the CRS model as follows. P1 sends the first message of the OT based on its input x, P2 prepares a garbled circuit for f and computes the second message of the OT on input the appropriate garbled keys for P1. Additionally P2 sends the keys for the input wires corresponding to its own input y and a NIZK proof to prove that the garbled circuit is correct and the keys sent in the OT are consistent with the circuit and P2's input. However, this solution is very inefficient as it requires non-black-box use of the underlying primitives.
In [1] Afshar et al. show a highly efficient NISC protocol, which is UC-secure in the CRS model. Toward this goal, they start with the multi-round highly-efficient 2PC protocol presented by Lindell [17] and squash it down to two rounds. Lindell's protocol is based on cut-and-choose techniques, and it requires several rounds of interaction.
The main contribution of [1] is to show how to perform all the checks required by the cut-an-choose technique noninteractively, using ingenious new ideas. We built upon their protocol to achieve the same result in the gRO model. In the following, we first outline the NISC protocol of [1] and then we discuss how we modify their construction to achieve our result.
NISC in the CRS model [1].
To implement the cut-and-choose in only two rounds [1] uses several techniques. For lack of space we cannot fully describe the ideas behind the protocol (the reader can refer to Pagg. 392-395 of [1] and references within for an overview of their techniques). Instead we highlight two salient points of their protocol that allow us to achieve the same result in the gRO model.
Recall that in a typical cut-and-choose protocol, P2 sends t garbled circuits gc1, . . . , gct to P1, who tests the correctness of them by asking P2 to "open" half of the circuits (i.e., to reveal the randomness used to generate them). If all the checks go through, P1 is convinced that most of the remaining circuits are correct . The first idea to achieve non-interactiveness, is to let P1 select the circuits that she wants to check via OT. Namely, additionally to the OT for the input, called input-OT in [1], P1 runs one OT for each garbled circuit. Such OTs are called circuit-OT: P1 participates to the i-th circuit-OT with input bi = 0 if she wants to check (i.e., obtain the randomness for) circuit gci, otherwise she sends bi = 1.
The second idea is to let P2 compute the garbled circuit, the messages for input-OT protocols, and other relevant information related to input/output consistency proofs, using randomness generated by a PRF. Namely, all such messages are computed by invoking a PRF with key seedi. In the circuit-OT protocol P2 will place the string seedi for the case bi = 0 and thus gci is a circuit that will be checked, and will instead send the keys corresponding to her input, in case bi = 1 and thus gci is an evaluation circuit.
Security of NISC [1] in the CRS model. The UCsecurity of NISC of [1] relies completely on the fully simulatability of the underlying PVW OT protocol. Informally, the intuition behind the proof is the following. Simulating Malicious P * 1 . The simulator extracts the secret input x * of P * 1 from the input-OT, by running the UC-simulator granted by PVW OT in the CRS model. It sends x * to the ideal functionality and receives the output z = f (x * , y). Next, from the circuit-OTs it extracts the indexes of the circuits that will be checked, and hence it computes the evaluation and checking garbled circuits accordingly.
Simulating Malicious P * 2 . The simulator generates the first message of P1 for circuit-OTs and input-OTs, by running honest P1 with a random input. Due to the security of PVW OT in the CRS model, these messages are distributed identically for the real input and the random one. When the simulator receives P2's message it performs the same correctness checks as P1. If P2 cheats in one of the checked garbled circuits, the simulator will abort, and this happens with the same probability that P1 would abort in the real execution. If the emulated P1 does not abort, the cut-andchoose guarantees that whp, at least one evaluated garbled circuit is correct. Therefore, the simulator derives the input of P2 by extracting the seed seedi of the correct circuit i from the corresponding execution of circuit-OT.
NISC in the gRO model: Our techniques.
In the original NISC protocol the extraction of the input of the sender is done by extracting the keys and the seeds from the executions of input-OT and circuit-OT. Our idea is to extract the input of P2 by observing the queries that P2 makes to the RO. Toward this end, we require that each seed seedi used to generate the randomness for the computation of the circuits and other critical information, is not picked by P2 but it is computed as the output of the RO. Namely, P2 queries the RO on some random input qi and set seedi = gRO(sid, P2 qi). Then, in the cut-and-choose phase, P2 plays the OT protocol using qi instead of seedi. In order to pass the consistency checks, P2 must query the RO to compute most of the PRF seeds. In this way the simulator, which obtains all the queries made to G gRO for a specific session sid, gets most of the seeds and is able to recompute the keys and garbled circuits without having to extract them from the input-OTs and circuit-OTs.
Therefore, the next step is to replace the PVW OT protocol used in [1] with our one-sided UC-simulatable OT protocol.
Security of our NISC in the gRO model. We now outline the ideas behind the security proof of our NISC protocol. Simulating Malicious P * 1 . Because our OT protocol is UC-simulatable against a malicious receiver the proof in this case follows the same proof provided in [1] . Simulating Malicious P * 2 . Our simulator works similarly to the simulator of [1] except that the information necessary to derive the input of P * 2 is obtained by looking at the queries to the RO. Due to the cut-and-choose, P2 is forced to query the RO to compute most of the PRF seeds used in the protocol, otherwise it will be caught whp by P1. Therefore, if P * 2 passes all the checks, whp the simulator will extract the relevant information.
The crucial difference in our case is in the indistinguishability of the first message of input-OTs computed by the simulator. In [1], the simulator, following the UC-simulator of PVW OT, sets the OT parameters contained in the CRS, to be a DDH tuple, with the result that its first message of input-OTs computed using a random input, is distributed identically to the one played by an honest P1 computed with the actual input.
In our case, as we are using our one-sided simulatable OT in the gRO model, the OT parameters are honestly generated to be a non-DDH tuple. Nevertheless, due to the indistinguishability property of our OT against malicious senders, the messages computed by the simulator are computationally indistinguishable from the messages computed by P1. For the formal proof the reader is referred to the full version.
The Protocol
In this section we present our modification of the NISC protocol of [1] which is UC-secure in the gRO model. We stress that the protocol is essentially the same as [1] with the following two modifications: (a) the underlying OT is onesided UC-simulatable; (b) the seed of the PRF is computed using the RO. In the description of the protocol we will highlight the points where the two protocols differ.
Notation and sub-protocols. We denote by oneside-COT1(b) and oneside-COT2((k 0 1 , k 1 1 ), . . . , (k 0 t , k 1 t )) Round 1 and Round 2 of our one-sided UC-simulatable (batch) committing OT shown in Sec. 4, respectively. Notation oneside stresses that we use a one-sided UC-simulatable OT instead of a fully UCsecure OT. Let G be a group of prime order q with generator g. Define EGCom(h, b, r) = (g r , h r g b ) as the "El Gamal" commitment. This commitment has two important properties: (1) there exists a very efficient way to prove the equality of two commitments, (2) there exists a trapdoor that allows the extraction of the committed value. Both properties are used crucially to guarantee correctness against a malicious sender. Let ReHash be a collision-resistant hash function that is a suitable randomness extractor.
Protocol 3. NISC in the gRO model(built upon [1]).
Inputs. P1 has input x ∈ {0, 1} n 1 and P2 has input y ∈ {0, 1} n 2 . Let f : {0, 1} n 1 × : {0, 1} n 2 → {0, 1} m and C be a circuit computing f . The inputs wires of P1 and P2 are denote by IN(1) and IN(2) respectively. The set of output wires is denoted by OUT.
Enc denotes an encryption scheme, Commit denotes a commitment scheme and prf a pseudo-random function. Let t denote the number of circuits and sid the session identifier. P1's message:
P1's Computation:
• Check circuit consistency. For each i ∈ T , compute seedi = gRO(sid, P2 qi) and check that seedi correctly generated circuit gci and the answers of the i-th execution of input-OT. If any check fails, abort.
• Check consistency of the input/output of P2.
For all circuits i ∈ [t]/T .
-Verify that hj,0 · hj,1 = h for j ∈ OUT.
-Check that outputsDecom i are correct discretelogs of the values in set {h j,b g K i,j,b } j∈OUT,b∈{0,1} .
-Check that inputs, inputsEq are consistent with the input-commitments: check ui,j,y j (g r j −r i,j,y j , h r j −r i,j,y j ) = EGCom(h; yj , rj). Otherwise abort.
-Evaluate circuit gi. Say P1 learns the labels {li,j } j∈OUT . P1 uses these labels to decrypt the corresponding encryptions Enc(lbl(gci, j, b), K i,j,b ) from the cheating recovery box. Then it checks if the result is the correct "decommitment" of the output recovery commitment h j,b g K i,j,b where the b are the actual output bits P1 received from gci. If all these steps pass for all output wires, label circuit gci as semi-trusted.
• Compute the output. If the output of all semitrusted circuits is the same, then output such value. Otherwise, -Let gci, gc i ′ be two semi-trusted circuits that have different outputs in the j-th output wire, and let li,j and l i ′ ,j be their output labels. P1 learns wj,0 from one of the labels and wj,1 from the other (since it learns K i,j,b , K i ′ ,j,1−b from the cheating recovery boxes, and w j,b +K i,j,b , w j,1−b +K i ′ ,j,1−b from outputsDecom i , outputsDecom i ′ ).
-P1 computes w = wj,0 + wj,1 and decrypts the input-commitments provided by P2. Say y is the input so obtained. P1 outputs f (x, y).
This concludes the description of the protocol.
Efficiency.
Our protocol inherits the same complexity of the NISC protocol of [1] with the following additional overhead. Concerning the exponentiations, the additional overhead corresponds to the overhead of the one-sided OT protocol that we discussed in Sec. 4. Concerning hash evaluations, our protocol requires t hash evaluations for P2 necessary to obtain each seed seedi for the PRF evaluations, and t/2 hash evaluations for the receiver when checking the garbled circuits.
CONCLUSIONS
We introduced the Global Random Oracle model and provided highly efficient protocols that are additionally UCsecure. The main advantage of the gRO model is that the random oracle is a global resource and is shared by all protocol executions, in contrast with the CRS/ RO model where the security crucially relies on the assumption that each protocol execution uses its own local CRS/ Random Oracle.
